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JUDGE GRANTED EMINENT DOMAIN
In the estimation of damages for land taken by a railroad
company under the right of eminent domain, the land owner is
permitted to recover for the depreciation of the rest of his property incident to the risk of accidental fires and other unavoidable
injuries. If accidental fires later occur, he must bear the loss for
he has already been paid for this risk. If the fires resulted from
negligence, he can recover for the loss inflicted, as each act of
negligence is a new tort and the original damages did not cover
the risk of negligent fires.
On the other hand, if my neighbor buys a vicious dog or
keeps large quantities of explosives on his premises, or builds a
reservoir on the hillside above my house, since my neighbor
does not have the power of eminent domain, I am not permitted
to recover from him as for a permanent depreciation of my property. If I can prove the dog, the magazine, or the reservoir to
be a nuisance, I can recover for the loss of rents or other damages
suffered prior to my suit but as it is presumed that my neighbor
will discontinue the nuisance when it has been adjudged to be
such, I cannot recover compensation for the indefinite continuance of the nuisance.
If instead of putting an end to the damage, my neighbor
continues it for over six years from the date he bought the dog
or built the magazine or reservoir, and the dog then kills my
sheep or bites my child, the magazine explodes or the reservoir
bursts, and my house is blown or swept away, these are new
,torts, not barred by the statute of limitations until six years have
elapsed from the date of the attack of the dog, the explosion, etc.
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Though I have brought one action and recovered loss of rents
due to dangers surrounding my property, I am not on this account precluded from recovering the value of my sheep, the value
of my child's service lost as a result of the bite and the value of
my demolished house.
Now men may be neighbors living side by side, owning adjoining properties, or they may own sections of the earth's surface lying one above the other, as when one owns the surface and
the other the underlying minerals. In the former case each neighbor is said to owe to the other the duty of lateral support of his
land and in the latter case the owner of the mineral is said to owe
to the owner of the surface the duty of subjacent support. One
surface owner may dig a pit on his land so near the land of his
neighbor that, if no precautions are taken to prevent it, the mere
lapse of time aided by the weakening effect of the seasons and
the leveling influence of gravitation, will cause some of the
neighbor's land to slide toward or into the pit. He who dug
the pit may finally wall it in and if he does this before the slides
have extended to his neighbor's lot, his neighbor's only loss
would be represented by the loss of rents, in case his tenant
moved rather than live in constant fear of the house sliding into
the pit. So again the owner of a vein of coal may take out the
coal and make no provision for the support of the surface or he
may timber the mine and neglect to renew the timbers as they decay. The roof of the mine will not drop at once but by a gradual
process salled " working" the strata between the opening and the
surface will gradually disintegrate and settle. Just as the pit
owner may forestall serious damage to the adjoining property
by building a wall in time, so the mine owner may provide artificial support for the surface adequate to permanently prevent a
subsidence.
Now one might suppose that the rights of the man whose
property is imperiled by the withdrawal of its natural support,
whether on the side or beneath it, would be analogous to the right
of the man whose enjoyment of his property is impaired by the
proximity of the savage dog, the powder magazine, or the impending body of water. If the support is withdrawn by a railroad company in grading for its tracks, or by a municipality in
grading its streets, since such withdrawals are intended to be per-
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manent and since the wrongdoers have the power of eminent domain, we would expect the landowner to be allowed to recover
once and for all a sum equal to the depreciation suffered by the
endangered property, and this is the law. This may not be
enough to enable the land owners to build a retaining wall along
the cut or the street but this apparent injustice often happens
when the injury is inflicted under the right of eminent domain.
No such power is conferred except upon corporations that prosecute enterprises of great public benefit and the inadequacy of the
measure of damages is condoned by the courts because of the advantage the new railroad or street will be to the landowner as
one of the public. But when an individual or private corporation endangers adjoining property, whether by excavations on
the surface or below the surface, since they have no right of eminent domain, we may be surprised to learn that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has conferred the right to perpetuate the
danger upon the payment of the same sum as that exacted from
the railroad or the city. Ordinarily, one affected by a nuisance
may compel its discontinuance by the recovery of punitive damages, if he is compelled to bring a series of suits, or he can secure
an injunction specifically requiring its abatement. As long as
the danger continues, however, there is no limit to the number of
suits that may be brought. As I could have sued my tenant each
month for the rent, so I can collect it each month from him who
has wrongfully frightened my tenant away. If my neighbor's
dog bites my child repeatedly, I may sue my neighbor after each
attack. If there are repeated explosions of the magazine, I may
collect each time what I must spend to repair my house. So
likewise, if it is repeatedly swept away by the flood from the
burst reservoir. Since it is just as possible to supply support
that has been temporarily removed, as it is to kill the savage dog,
remove the explosive or drain the reservoir, we would expect the
courts to compel the discontinuance of the non-support as they
would compel the killing of the dog, i. e. by punitive damages or
injunction. In any event we would expect it to be recognized
that the persistent withholding of support until a subsidence is
as continuous a wrong as the continued failure to drain the reservoir until it bursts or the failure to kill the dog until he bites or
the failure to remove the explosive until the explosion.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Instead of the law in Pennsylvania being as has been suggested, it is this. As soon as the support of my land is so far
impaired that it some day may subside, the statute of limitations
begins to run not merely against my right of action for the depreciation of my property resulting from the risk of subsidence
but also against my right to sue for the actual physical destruction of my home when it occurs. Just as when the withdrawal
of support is made by a corporation having the right of eminent
domain, all I can recover is the depreciation in the value of my
property. If my property should collapse within six years, the
actual damage may be shown but I cannot recover the cost of repairs unless this be less than the depreciation. In case the cost
of repairs is less than the depreciation then that is all I can recover, and whatever actual injuries occur after six years from the
original withdrawal of support I must bear without any compensation. The legislature has empowered railroads and municipalities to appropriate land and to withdraw the support of lands
when this is a necessary incident of the construction of their improvements. Our Supreme Court has empowered the coal companies of the State to do the same thing on much more favorable
terms. The railroad must give an adequate bond or*compensate the adjoining owner before it goes ahead. The coal company need give no bond and need make no effort to protect the
surface owner. When he seeks an injunction, he is turned out
of court with the assurance that his remedy at law is adequate.
The Supreme Court not only forbids the lower courts to specifically enforce the duty to support the surface but they require
them to assume that no regard will be paid to this duty by the
coal companies. No incentive is given the coal operator to renew the supports that decay, for his failure to do so is no tort.
The removal of the original support provided by nature is the
only act that is recognized as tortious and in a recent case it is
laid down that suit may then be brought and all the depreciation
of the surface incident to a permanent withdrawal of support recovered. There is no recorded case in which such a recovery has
been had, for the earlier cases had all indicated that no action
would lie until thd inadequacy of the support had been evidenced
by some subsidence. The withdrawal of support is to be treated
as an act of quasi-condemnation of the surface owner's right to
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have nature's supports remain or to have others substituted and
maintained. The same damages are recoverable as for an actual
condemnation. Whatever is recovered in this action, it is all
that may ever be recovered, for there is but one cause of action,
regardless of how numerous and widely separated in point of
time the actual injuries may be.
In England the surface owner may sue for each subsidence
as often as one occurs. If he has to repair his house a dozen
times, he may sue as often and collect the cost. He does not sue
once for all as for a depreciation based on the opinions of experts
as to the probability of future subsidences. He has six years
from the date of each injury within which to bring suit for that
injury. If the building of the surface owner is so badly cracked
and displaced that it would be of less value after it is repaired
than it was before the injury, the owner may recover the amount
of this depreciation as well as the cost of making repairs but the
coal operator is not enabled to purchase the right to cause further damage ad libitum, without the consent of the surface
owner.
It has been urged that if the depreciation due to fear of future damage is not compensated at once an injustice is done the
owner in case he has to sell the property. The English rule is
open to this objection but it is a slight one as compared with the
hardship inflicted on surface owners by the Pennsylvania rule.
(West Lehigh Colliery Co. vs. Tunnicliffe, (1908) A. C. 27. 10
Ann. Cas. 74).
If my neighbor removes the natural lateral support of my
lot and undertakes to supply the support by erecting a retaining
wall which proves effective for six years and then falls down, it
would seem to be a startling proposition to declare that he is under no obligation to rebuld it and that he is protected by the
statute of limitations from any liability for the injuries that I
suffer as a result of his failure to continue to support my lot. It
sounds absurd to say that I should have had the wall inspected
and should have proven by witnesses that the wall would some
day fall down and that my only right of action accrued to me
when the wall was built, unless I can show that my neighbor
subsequently weakened the wall by his own act. Yet this is
exactly what the law of Pennsylvania requires, unless we are to
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assume that there is one law for adjoining surface owners and
another law for the coal mining companies. Our Supreme
Court has not yet declared that the duty to repair a retaining wall
shall continue only for six years from the time of its erection but
they have said that the duty to support the surface over coal
mines continues for but six years after the coal is removed and
no logical distinction can be made. Just such a case is that of
Church of Holy Communion vs. R. R. Co. 66 N. J. L. 218, 55
L. R. A. 81, decided some months before our own Supreme
Court decided Noonan vs. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, 55 L. R. A. 410.
The New Jersey Supreme Court said: "The injury sustained
by reason of the defective construction of the wall was a continuing injury. It is quite clear that, if a suit had been brought
in 1882, the plaintiffs could not have recovered in"such a suit for
the damages which would be sustained in 1887. It would have
been impossible at that time to have anticipated the future deterioration of the wall, and the damages arising therefrom, and
to have made an estimate of the amount thereof as the basis of
computation. Compensation in such a suit must be sought after
the damages are sustained. In such cases the cause of action
depends upon the actual damage, and the statute of limitations
begins to run from the time when such damage is sustained."
The same thought is thus expressed in the leading English case,
Backhouse v. Bonomi, 16 Eng. Rul. Cas. 216, by Wills, J.:
"The contention on the part of the defendant is that the action
must be brought within six years after the excavation is made,
and that it is immaterial whether any actual damage has occurred oi not. The jury, according to this view, would have,
therefore, to decide upon the speculative question whether any
damage was likely to arise; and it might well be that in many
cases they would, upon the evidence* of mineral surveyors and
engineers, find that no damage was likely to occur, when the
most serious injury afterwards might in fact occur, and in others
find and give large sums of money for apprehended damage,
which in point of fact never might arise. This is certainly not
a state of law to be desired."
But it is not the purpose of this article to repeat the writer's
views as to the decision of Noonan vs. Pardee. They were sufficiently elaborated in this journal six years ago. It is to the
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decisions of our Supreme Court since that review was written
that we desire to call attention. Let us first take the case of
Woods vs. Pittsburg Coal Co., 230 Pa. 107. The defendant
company owned a vein of coal beneath the plaintiff's farm and
another four foot vein of coal, also the property of the plaintiff.
An injunction was sought to restrain the removal of the coal in
such a manner as to cause the subsidence of the surface and the
disturbance of the overlying vein of coal, and it was also asked
that the defendant be required to provide proper supports for
the surface already undermined. It was decided that this is a
wrong for which such an adequate remedy at law exists that
there would be no justification for the interference of a court of
equity. The threatened damage was not only the injury to the
land and the buildings but also to the valuable overlying coal
vein. The Court said: "Our cases hold that the removal of
coal without having or providing adequate support for the surface, is in itself an injury to the owner. The injury is not in any
way dependent on the natural subsidence or caving in of the
surface, but exists at once when any part of the surface has been
endangered by leaving it without support. It follows necessarily, that when the duty to support has been violated a cause of
action at once arises, if for nothing more than to vindicate the right
of support." Now an action is brought to vindicate a right when
there is danger that a wrongdoer, who is committing a continuous tort, may acquire a prescriptive right to do the wrongful
act. But the law in Pennsylvania is that the withholding of
support is not a continuous tort. Respecting an excavation under forty acres, the Court says: "The injury to the forty acres
if endangered, is complete in itself, without regard to what the
defendant may or may not hereafter do, and the plaintiff is entitled
at once to receive such damages as are proper to remunerate him
for the injury he has sustained." It is assumed that the mineoperator who has neglected to furnish adequate support will not
amend his neglect by later furnishing them. The injury must
be regarded as permanent and as having been inflicted once and
for all time when the support was removed. Instead of the suit,
brought at once "to vindicate his right," serving to prevent the
acquisition by the operator of a prescriptive right to disregard
the duty of support, the action serves only to bar any later action
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for the collapse of his home, for there can be but one suit on a
single cause of action. The man who is thus impatient "to vindicate his right" has simply played into the hands of the operator by bringing suit at a time when his chances of a substantial
recovery are the slightest, and releasing him from liability for
any future damages.
The idea that the only tort is the withdrawal is applied in
the doctrine that one who purchases the property on which the
excavation has been made incurs no obligation to make provisions for the support of the dominant property. Though the
withdrawal is not tortious if artificial substitutes are supplied,
the new owner is under no obligation to prevent the withdrawal
from becoming tortious. The one injured must locate and recover from the man whose active wrong contributed the first
element to the tort. The new owner is not to be regarded as
maintaining a nuisance. This idea first laid down in Noonan
vs. Pardee, has recently been applied as between adjoining surface owners in the case of McMullen vs. Steel Co., 47 Super. Ct.
570. It was even declared that "Where one knows that the lateral support of his property has been removed, it is his duty to
protect his own property, and to make application for the right to
enter upon his neighbor's property, if necessary to enable him
to put up the proper barricade or protection." Contrast the doctrine of Wier's App. 81% Pa. 203 and Weightman vs. Ruffner,
22 W. N. C. 36.
The measure of damages is stated in the Woods case to be
the depreciation in value suffered by the land undermined as a
result of the danger of subsidence. .This was thought to be such
an adequate compensation for the surface owner that the Court
thought the operators should not be enjoined against wrongfully
causing a like depreciation in the value of the rest of the property, some 240 acres. The plaintiff urged that it might be a long
time before the whole of his land was undermined and that he
would either have to bring a number of suits as new sections of
his farm were endangered by the omission to provide supports
or else he would have to wait till the whole tract was undermined
before he brought suit. But as Noonan vs. Pardee had decided
that after six years from the time all the coal is removed under
a given section of land, no action can be brought for the injury
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to that section, regardless of how recent the subsidences may have
been, the plaintiff could not afford to wait till his whole property
was undermined before bringing suit. Only in the event that
the defendants should elect to push their operations with such
energy as to take out all the coal in six years, could one suit cover
the entire.injury. As to this the Court said: "It is evident that
the remedy at law will afford ample indemnification. If it be
urged that the adoption of such a remedy would lead to a multiplicity of suits, the answer is, -this would not necessarily result.
It may very well be, if the injury to the plaintiff is what he supposes it to be, that one compensatory verdict would have the effect to avoid any occasion for a second suit. But in any event
that would be a matter for the plaintiff's own determination."
How the plaintiff could get damages for a prospective injury to
land not yet undermined is not explained, and in the absence of
such a recovery, how one verdict could be fully compensatory,
when only one-sixth of the farm had been undermined, is hard
to see. The plaintiff is compelled to bring new suits at frequent
intervals as new sections of his farm are endangered or else he
must forego the recovery of the damages already due until the
work is completed. It is no consolation for him to be told that
the choice is all his. Either horn of the dilemna will work a
hardship to him. Since the mine owner is free to mine under
any particular tract at intervals extending over a long period, and
since equity will not require him to make any provision for surface support, it is evident that a surface owner who would enforce his rights in actions at law, is very likely to be compelled
to bring a multitude of suits. The surface owner's right to
bring an indefinite number of suits is expressed by the Court in
the following words: "The rule is that in all cases where injury is of a continuous nature, every fresh injury is a ground of
action, and the person whose property is injured thereby may
maintain separate and distinct suits therefore, each embracing all
causes of action therefrom up to the time of the action brought."
The existence of this privilege of bringing many suits is advanced
as a reason for regarding the remedy at law as adequate, and in
the next breath, when confronted with the suggestion that one
of the principal grounds of equity jurisdiction is the avoidance
of many suits, we are told that the plaintiff need not bring them,
if he does not want to.
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The most noteworthy feature of this decision is the emphatic enunciation of the doctrine that though no palpable physical injury to the surface has occurred, no subsidences, cracks, or
disturbances of overlying seams of coal, nevertheless the surface
owner may maintain a suit, if he can convince a jury that the
supports provided by the coal operator are likely to prove unequal to their burden and he is entitled to receive as damages the
difference in the value of his property before and after it was
endangered. In so declaring, the opinion professes to follow
Noonan vs. Pardee "both in letter and logic." Here are some
quotations from the opinion of the Court in Noonan vs. Pardee:
"If the mining which caused the subsidence was more than
six years before suit brought, and the injury occurred within
six years, even though the miner or operator is still in possession
he is not answerable in damages, for there is no right of action for
damages until the damage occurs." x x x
"If the cause of the
injury was within six years, although at the date of the deed (to
the plaintiff) the damage was not susceptible of compensation, yet
afterward became so by the subsidence of the surface, their right to
sue was then fixed, a right which, from the nature of the case,
could not have had more than a doubtful existence before the actual
damage occurred."
In an article in the Forum of 1907, page 1, Dean Wim. Trickett reviews the Pennsylvania cases in an exhaustive discussion
of all the decisions up to that date. On page 11 he says: "If
the possibility of the effects of improper mining lessens the value
of the surface, still clearer is it that when the improper mining
has occurred, but before a cave-in has followed, the expectancy
of such cave-in will be keen, and its effect on market value grave.
There is no case in which compensation has been given for the
depreciation of value, during the interval between the removal
of the support, and the subsidence. The court may however, enjoin against an ablation of the supports, which would endanger
a house in which people live." Nothwithstanding the statement
of the Court in Noonan vs. Pardee that the "right to sue, from
the nature of the case could not have more than a doubtful existence before the actual damage occurred" and through the context shows clearly that by "the actual damage" was meant the
subsidence, the Court now asserts: "It is nowhere suggested in
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the opinion in the case, that the damages resulting from failure to
provide surface support are not susceptible of computation until
mining has ceased, and that therefore the right of action must
be so long suspended, or that it is suspended until a subsidence
has occurred. There can be no such thing as suspension of a right of
action; the right is present or it does not exist."
Compare the following interpretation of Noonan vs. Pardee
from p. 7 of Dean Trickett's article: "The practical conclusion
that Dean, J. draws from the doctrine that the removal of support is the cause of action, is the breach of duty, is simply that
the statute of limitations will run from that removal. He does
not say, as he logically should, that the owner of the superficies
may sue instantly upon the removal and before any falling in
of it. On the contrary he says that the right to sue is "fixed,"
whatever that may mean, by the future subsidence. He even
says that the right to sue, from the nature of the case, cannot
prior to the subsidence, have more than a doubtful existence. It
is entirely clear that there can never be a recovery for an alleged
breach of right,while the existence of the right to sue is doubtful. He
even says that while the cause of action arises with the removal
of the support, no one 'suffers' then. One only suffers when
there is a cave-in, and he is not the one who owns when the support is removed, or who becomes owner later, if he in turn parts
with the ownership before the cave-in. He only sustains damage who owns when the subsidence occurs. If that is so, the
mere removal of support, is dannum absque injuria, and yet it is
the violation of a right! It is only the subsidence consequent
on the removal that is damnum curn injuria; that is, that is actionable. And so we come back to the principle which seemed
to be repudiated, that there can be no successful suit, and therefore, there is no breach of duty, unless and until there is a subsidence."
On one point Mr. Justice Stewart and Dr. Trickett agree, to
wit, the law knows of no such thing as a right of action in a
state of suspended animation, or as Justice Dean describes it,
a state of "doubtful existence." Dr. Trickett concludes that the
right so described is no right at all. Justice Stewart reaches
just the opposite conclusion and holds that since the statute of
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limitations is applied from the date of the mining, there must be
a substantial present right to maintain an action at that date.
The rule of Noonan vs. Pardee in re the statute of limitations is thus stated by Dr. Trickett, (p. 14): "In Noonan vs.
Pardee the Court at length held (a) that the cause of action is
the withdrawal of support, and not the later subsidence, and that
the six years must run from the former and not from the latter
event. x x x (b) Nevertheless the cause of action is not an
adequate cause of action, for no suit begun before an actual subsidence will be entertained, although when one subsidence has
occurred and an action is then brought, damages may be recovered in that action, (nay, probably must be claimed in that
action) for any subsidences occurring- between the inception of
the suit and the trial. (c) Because the cause of action, viz. the
ablation of the supports, although adequate to set the statute of
limitations in operation, is not adequate to sustain an action until reinforced by some subsidence, the unenforceable, the ghostly
right of action passes with the ownership of the surface, until
a subsidence occurs, and he who is then the owner, may, and no
other, no predecessor, and no successor, can bring the action,
positions which are worthy of the astonished admiration of the world
and have secured it."
Justice Dean's own language was this: "When the right
to sufficient support has been violated, the course of action, it is
true, arises, but the owner in possession when the consequences
follow, is the one who suffers. There may in the interval have
been several owners, none of whom sustained damage except the
last; he alone has the right to sue, because to him only has passed
th6 right to enforce by suit the collection of a damage occurring
during his possession. Until they actually occur, no one can tell
when they will occur, or that they ever will. Each grantee has a
right to presume, (i. e. is compelled to assume) that the subjacent owner has performed his legal duty, and the price, while
probably somewhat depreciated by the possible risk, is not fixed
on a presumption, that his land will subside because of any
special failure in duty on the part of him who has taken out the
coal."
The Court now assures us that the doctrine that every owner
in a series of transfers has a right of action for the depreciation
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that occurs during his ownership as the result of a fresh ablation of supports, follows the doctrine enunciated in the foregoing
paragraph "both in letter and logic." "Any apparent conflict disappears when the difference between the facts there and here is
considered. That case was an action t6 recover for the subsidence
of a lot of ground and consequent injury to the house erected
thereon, not for failure to provide a sufficient surface support as
the mining progressed. It was there held that notwithstanding
the injury resulting directly from the subsidence, the latter was
only the consequence of a previous cause, viz.-failure by the
mine owner to provide sufficient support, and that if this occurred more than six years before action brought, regardless of
when the subsidence occurred, the action was barred by the
statute of limitations. What was thefe being considered was
whether the right of action in such case passed to one who acquired the surface after the failure to provide the support had
occurred, for the recovery of damages for the specific injury resulting from a subsidence during his ownership. x x x Bearing
in mind that the action there was for a specific injury occasioned by
actual subsidence, and not for failure by the owner of the surface
(mine?) to provide support, the language used to the effect, that
at the date of the plaintiff's deed the damage complained of was
not susceptible of computation, and only became so after the subsidence had occurred, it becomes clear that the reference is to the
damages which resulted from the specific subsidence as a thing
apart from, and yet a consequence of, failure to provide adequate
surface support."
It would thus appear that a right of action vests in the owner
in possession when the coal is removed. This right of action is
for the general injury due to the danger of subsidences and the
.depreciation in the value of the property due to this danger is
the measure of his damages. The next owner suffefs a "specific
injury" in the shape of a subsidence. Provided.his predecessor
in title brought no action, the now owner has a right of actiorr
for this specific injury for it was "not susceptible of computation" until it happened. He recovers the cost of repairs, makes
them, and sells. The new owner suffers more "specific injuries,"
but he may not recover for them, for there was but one cause of
action, the original mining.
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In his dissenting opinion in Berkey vs. Coal Mining Co.,
220 Pa. at p. p. 79 and 80, justice Mestrezat says: "As the mining progresses the surface will be cracked and subside, and each
day will result in one or more causes of action, until the coal has all
been removed. The trespasses will therefore be constantly recurring, compelling the plaintiff, even if an action at law is adequate, to redress his injuries by a multiplicity of suits. It is
apparent from these facts that equity is the proper remedy for
redress of the plaintiff's injuries under the established practice
of this state."
(CONTINUED IN MAY NUMBER)
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MOOT COURT
DALTON v. SINAT
Non-Assignability of Right of Re-Entry for Breach of Condition
Contained in a Deed

STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Ropes granted, for $2500, to Sinat a piece of land, in fee simple, on condition that he should not erect any frame building upon it.
Three years afterwards, Sinat violated the condition. Ropes meantime
had transferred to Sampfer his right to enforce the condition for $100. A
month later, Sampfer transferred this right to Dalton for $500. The
parties having learned that Sinat had made a contract for the construction of the frame house, and that the condition would therefore probably
be broken.
Bender for Plaintiff.
Carroll for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
BARRETT, J. Proceeding under the assumption, that the condition
in the deed from Ropes to Sinat is a condition subsequent, and the law
implies that a right of re-entry upon condition broken exists in grantor, we
are brought face to face with the question, whether a contingent right of
re-entry can be assigned to a stranger, so that such stranger can bring an
action of ejectment for the recovery of the land. No one can seriously
question the proposition that such possibility of re-entry was not assignable at common law. Bl. Com. 290 note (6). 3 Coke 64a.
Tiffany in his work on Real Property, at page 182, says, "the right
to take advantage of a condition subsequent belongs, at common law,
exclusively to grantor or lessor and his heirs, and he cannot reserve such
right to others, even by express stipulation. Nor can the right to enforce
a forfeiture, or, as it is usually called, the right of re-entry, be at common law, assigned or transferred by the grantor to third person." Again
on page 183, the same authority says, "These restrictions as to persons
able to take advantage of a breach and the inability to assign the right,
have been generally recognized in this country, and, not only will an attempted assignment of right of re-entry be void, but it will have effect of
destroying the grantor's right to enforce the condition which is thereafter
in effect, nonexistent. 40 N. H. 222; 77 Am. Dec. 708; 129 Ill. 466; Rice
v. R. R. Co. 12 Allen (Mass). 141."
The reason for this restriction was, as Blackstone puts it, "lest it
should enable great men of large social and political influence to obtain pretended titles whereby justice might be trodden down and the
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weak oppressed." Also, it is a well known fact that the common law
was very much opposed to maintainance. If the condition had been
broken, and then Ropes had conveyed his right of re-entry, there might be
ground to contend that the grantee of the right could win in an action of
ejectment.
In this case there was simply a contingent right of re-entry left in
Ropes after conveyance of the fee, but that is no estate. A mere possibility; no more coupled with an interest than the possibility that a son
will inherit from his living father, and therefore in its nature not transferable. Nicoll v. N. Y. & C. R. R., 12 N. Y. 121. In which case it is
very emphatically held that a possibility of re-entry upon condition.
broken is not assignable. Also, in Upington v. Corrigan, 151 N. Y. 143,
it is stated that a right of re-entry upon condition broken is not transferable.
The statement that a right of re-entry cannot be assigned is sustained
in the following cases: 155 N. Y. 655; Hopkins v. Smith, 162 Mass. 444,
40 N. H. 37; 55 Me. 157; 10 Ohio C. C. 190; 31 Conn. 468 (a statute has
since been passed in Connecticut, making such rights assignable); 79
Ala. 288; Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. 284; Parker v. Nichols, 7 Pick. 111;
Rector of King's Chapel v. Pelham, 9 Mass. 501; Upington v. Corrigan,
151 N. Y. 143; Pierce v. Keator, 70 N. Y. 419.
In McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Pa. 140, it is held, merely, that grantor
may transfer a right of re-entry, by expressly stipulating so, in the deed.
But this is no way incompatible with our foregoing proposition.
In Bouvier v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. R. Co., 67 N. J. L. 281, the judge
said, "in any case wherever the English law against maintainance is
not in force, a right of entry for condition broken should be held transferable after breach of condition. Before breach, transfer to be legal
must be authorized by legislation." But even in that case, the right to
transfer the possibility of the right of re-entry to assigns was expressly
reserved in original deed. It will be observed that when Ropes conveyed
to Sinat and Sinat to Dalton, the condition had not yet been broken.
Judge Gibson says in Hamilton v. Elliot, 5 S. & R. 375, "none but
feoffer or his heirs can enter" for condition broken "and the reason why
a right of re-entry cannot be assigned is that a contrary doctrine would
favor maintainance and promote litigation." From this it might very
easily, be implied that despite the fact that Pennsylvania was not opposed
to the doctrine of maintainance, yet the courts recognized the old common law rule against assigning chooses in action.
Some States have changed the old common law rule by statute, but
we can find no statute in Pennsylvania which abolishes the rule, and we
are of the opinion that there is too much judicial legislation. If the
common law is to be rescinded, it is for the legislature and not, the
courts, to take the proper steps.
Before breach of the condition (as in this case), the reason why an
assignee cannot tak advantage of a condition broken really depends
upon the inherent incapacity of the condition itself; but after breach,
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condition itself is gone and there arises in its stead, a right or title of
entry which is as little capable of assignment as the condition, although
the obstacle to its assignment is of a difficult nature, arising out of policy of the common law and the provisions of the statute of maintainance,
which forbade the sale or transfer of claims or demands unsustained by
possession and resting solely in entry or action.
Equity will oftentimes enforce a condition in regard to restrictions
upon land, for the benefit of neighboring land owners, but this case in
no way comes under this class of cases.
To conclude, we maintain that a possibility of a right of re-entry
left in grantor after conveyance of a fee simple, cannot be assigned nor
sold.
Judgment for Defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The doctrine enunciated by the opinion of learned court below is one
in justification of which no principle save stare decisis can be successfully
invoked.
At common law a right of entry was originally not assignable. Two
reasons have been given for this doctrine. By some authorities it is said
that the rule was the result of the feudal origin of conditions which were
originally inserted exclusively for the benefit of the lord for the purpose
of securing to the lord the performance of the feudal services by the
tenant. Tiffany on Real Property 182, 185. Co. Litt. 201a. By other
authorities it is stated that the rule was due to the fact that it was considered against sound policy to allow any man to transfer to another a
right of entry, because in this way, under the old conditions of society,
litigation would necessarily be increased and the rich would be encouraged to buy up pretended titles for the purpose of enforcing them against
the poor. It is probably that both of these reasons were influential in
shaping the rule. 26 Har. Law. Review 176.
Neither of these reasons is applicable at the present time arid it has,
therefore, very properly been held that a right of entry is assignable, Yazoo R. Co. v. Traction Co., 100 Miss 281, 56 So. 393. And in many
States the right is made assignable by statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 1902 sec.
4051, Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 1Q46, 1047. In a majority of jurisdictions, however, the original common law rule has been followed. 4 Cyc. 16.
The questions seems never to have been directly presented to the
courts of Pennsylvania. In Hamilton v. Elliot, 5 S. & R. 385, Gibson said
that a right of entry could not be assigned because a contrary doctrine
would favor maintainance and promote litigation. Commenting upon
this statement of Gibson, Roger, J., in McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Pa. 150
said, "This is a fair case for the application of the maxim, cessante
ratione cessat ipsa lex." In the same case it is said that the reason why
a right of entry could not be assigned in England was because no title
could be made to land held by another adversely. In a majority of States,
including Pennsylvania, no restriction upon the right of transfer aris-
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ing from the fact that the land is adversely held by a third person is
recognized, so again, it seems to be a fair case for the application of the
maxim cessante, etc., Tiffany on Real Property, sec. 498. Stoeser v.
Benneg, 6 Ben 416.
In view of the fact (1) that the causes which gave rise to the old
rule no longer exist, (2) that in Pennsylvania contingent interests, expectancies, choses in action and after acquired property, have been held
assignable (3) that ordinarily it is immaterial to the holder of the land
who forces the right of re-entry, we are tempted to overrule opinion of
the learned court below, but yielding to the great weight of authority in
other jurisdictions, we affirm it.
CONRAD v. FOSTER
Trespass A. C.

F.-Implied License-Non-Negligent Acts Performed
Under an Implied License-Damages

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Foster sent his servant to remove some leaves that had gathered in
the gutter attached to his roof in order that the rain might not overflow
upon the roof of Conrad. The servant leaned over too far and fell to
Conrad's roof below. When he fell his body was projecting beyond the
property line of Foster, but he was exercising ordinary care. In his
fall the servant broke a sky-light and both Conrad and his wife were injured by flying glass. It is agreed that $50 will repair the sky-light and
$500 would represent Conrad's personal injuries and $200 would cover
loss of his wife's services.
McCall for Plaintiff.
Saul for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
VAN BLARCOM, J. The plaintiff in this case seeks to recover
for the consequences of an act done by the defendant's servant while exercising ordinary care. The recovery claimed is based upon the fact that
the defendant's servant in doing a lawful act was a trespasser and .therefore liable for the consequences of the act. The facts state that he was
exercising ordinary care. This means that he was free from any negligence.
But it is contended that he was a trespasser in view of the fact that
his body was projecting over the property line. True he was a technical
trespasser. The Common Law theory was that the property line extended from the center of the earth to the sky. In order to view the case
in the most favorable light let us review a few of the early cases: In
one case a horse at pasture in a field kicked through the fence and injured a
horse in the adjoining field. It was held that a trespass had been committed and that the owner was liable. L. Ames' Cases on Torts, 44
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(1874). The firing of a gun loaded with shot in a field was held to be a
case of trespass, L. Ames' Cases on Torts 42 (1815). One in building
on his own property must so carry on his operations as not to injure his
neighbor, but if timber falls upon his neighbor's property he is guilty of
trespass. It will be observed that these are cases where the objects
causing the injury were close to the earth. Another fact in these cases
is that the parties were more or less guilty of negligence, if not actual
negligence, such as would be implied.
After an extended search we have been unable to find a case where
a person has been held guilty of trespass where his act was performed a
distance from the earth and under such circumstances as to show an absence of negligence, either actual or implied.
It is true that a person cannot erect a building so as to project upon
anothers land. Telephone or telegraph wires cannot be placed over a
person's land without his consent or without making compensation therefore. These are cases where the passage would be of long duration.
But is it reasonable to say that a person cannot place his body over
another's land in order to accomplish a purpose lawful in nature, which
at best is for a short duration, without being guilty of trespass. We
think not.
Even though we considered the defendant guilty of trespass, we do
not think a recovery should be allowed, as we consider the damage in
this case the result of'an "inevitable accident." "Where the defendant's
act, tho tortious, does not amount to a wanton wrong, it is generally held
that responsibility attaches only for such consequences as were or should
have been contemplated, or might in the light of attendant circumstances
have been forseen. An individual is not presumed to contemplate the
coincidence of events having no natural or probable connection in the
mind and which cannot by ordinary prudence be foreseen as likely to
happen in consequence of the act in which he is engaged. Amer. &
Eng. Ency., 8 P. 603.
When an injury has been done a person, with no negligence on the
part of the person causing the injury, the law of Pennsylvania seems to
be that the injured person will have to bear the loss himself. It is a wrong
for which the law provides no remedy. The rule damnum absque injuria
applies. Baran v. Reading Iron Co., 202 Pa. 274; P. R. R. v. Lippencott,
116 Pa. 462.
In the case at bar, it would be unreasonable to hold that the injury
could have been averted or have been guarded against by any human foresight. The defendant's servant may have gone on the house top many times
before. The house may have been so situated that it would be impossible
for a person to guard against intruding over the property line. The servant was engaged in an act lawful in nature. If leaves had been allowed to remain in the gutter the result would have been that
water would haVe dripped over on the property of the plaintiff and defendant would have been liable in damages. At the best defendant's servant was doing an act which was alike beneficial to both parties.
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If the facts in this case were before us for the first time we would
find for the defendant, but in the present case we feel ourselves bound by
the decision in Seligman v. Thorpe, 14 Dickinson Law Review, page 259.
The facts in that case were very similar to those in the present case.
The sum of $50.00 having been agreed upon as the amount covering the
damage to the sky-light, we find for him in that amount. In Ellis v.
Loftus Iron Works, L. Ames 44, damages for injuries to personal property having been allowed in an action Q. C. F., a fortori, we think the
sum agreed upon as representing the personal injuries in this case should
be allowed.
Judgment for plaintiff in sum of $750.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Foster's servant projected his body beyond the division line between Conrad's and Foster's lots. The result was his fall, of which the
consequence was injury to the sky-light and to Conrad and his wife.
It does not appear that the gutter on Foster's house, over hung to
any extent, Conrad's lot. The maintainance of it is not the alleged trespass. That trespass is the protrusion beyond the division line, first of
a part of the body, then of the whole of the body, of Foster's servant.
Doubtless, in ordinary cases, the projection of a part of the body of
the servant of Foster, even for a moment, would be a trespass. The
intrusion of the teeth and the hoof of a horse, by ever so little, was held
a trespass, in Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., 1 Ames' Cases on Torts 44. A's
thrusting his hand or arm across the boundary separating his lot from
B's was seemingly regarded as a trespass, in I-annabalson v. Sessions,
116 Pa. 457, 1 Wigmore Torts, 558.
The motive of Foster's servant's act, was laudable. It was to prevent
water dripping from the spout upon the land of Conrad. But ordinarily
he would have no right to bestow an unsolicited benefit upon Conrad,
by invading the close of the latter. 38 Cyc. 1002.
When a trespass is committed, the trespasser is liable for all the
results of it, which might have been foreseen, and are "natural" and
"probable," and which could not have been averted, had the person on
whose close the trespass was committed, not contributed thereto by his
own negligence. We are unable to say that the fall of the servant was
not a forseeable result, nor the breaking of the sky-light, nor the injury
to the plaintiff and his wife.
But, there are certain uses of B's land by A which are excusable
for various reasons. There are express licenses by fhe owner, or implied licenses, or authorizations in exceptional cases by the law. Cooley
Torts, p. 356 (2d edition). A retail dealer invites the public to enter his
shop. Every man is said to license impliedly, his neighbors to enter
his premises for the purpose of visiting him. "Custom" says Cooley,
"must determine in these cases, what the limit is of the implied invitation." I bid. Cf. Gowen v. Exchange Co., 5 W. & S. 141.
In towns and cities, houses are often built close to the partition line.
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Gutters are often constructed on roofs. They not infrequently become
clogged with leaves, straw, dust and other substances. A well known
result of this condition, is that the water of rains overflows the sides of
the gutter and is spilt on the adjacent ground. Good neighbors are desirous to prevent this. Accidents are incidental to all human activities,
the legitimate and the censurable. It is not saying too much to say that
every man has a right to assume that his neighbor will not only tolerate,
but will applaud his efforts to clean the spouts, and, if in so doing, he
should even intentionally, put his arm or a portion of his body across
the boundary, will feel that he is doing a wholly innocent and even a praisworthy thing.
Licenses may be revoked. If A has warned B not to come upon his,
A's premises, for the purpose of visiting him i. e. has countermanded the
implied license, B, in visiting A would be a trespasser. If Conrad had
notified Foster that he must'not clean the gutter, or, at any rate, must
not pass any part of his body, in cleaning the gutter, across the boundary
line, Foster would have been a trespasser in violating this prohibition.
It does not appear that anything had transpired from which it was Foster's duty to think that the acts which he did, would be esteemed a wrong
to him by Conrad.
There having been a virtual license to Foster, to put his body or a
part of it, over the boundary line, whatever resulted from the non-negligent execution of this license, must be deemed also licensed. The dropping of the body of Foster's servant, upon the sky-light, which, otherwise would have been a trespass, was not such. It was not due to negligence. The verdict expressly finds that he "was exercising ordinary
care."
The suggestion has been made that in action of trespass quare clausurn fregit, damages for injuries to the realty only might be recovered.
We are of the opinion that when the close has been illegally broken, the
owner may recover compensation for all the damage done, not only to the
realty, but to any personalty, upon the premises, or to the person of the
owner of the premises, or of any human being, e. g. a wife, a child, injury
to whom might give a right to compensation. In Dolph v. Ferris, 7
W. & S. 367, the defendant was liable in the action of trespass q. c. f. for
the trespass of a bull within the close, and for the death of a horse therein,
which the bull caused. In McClung v. Dearborne, 134, Pa. 396, Williams
J., observes that the jury "should have been allowed to assess adequate
damages for the breach of the plaintiff's close [a dwelling house] if the
entry was forcible and for all the injury done him by any and. all defendant's servants while engaged in the business of seizifig and carrying
away the organ." Some of the injuries were to persons who composed
the plaintiff's family.
Since, then, the act of Foster's servant, in leaning beyond the boundary line, cannot be regarded as otherwise than authorized by Conrad,
in the-absence of a prohibition from the latter, and inasmuch as all the
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non-negligent subsequent acts of the servant must be deemed covered by
the same permission, there is no liability and the judgment should be
for the defendant.
Reversed.

MASBERTON v. HARRISON
Landlord and Tenant-Distress-Eviction under Act April 3, 1830 P. L.
187-Burden of Proof
STATEMENT. OF FACTS
Proceeding before a Justice of Peace to dispossess tenant.
Masberton let his farm to Harrison for four years at a yearly rental of $500. Harrison covenanting to pay the rent punctually on July 1st
and Jan. 1st of each year in equal installments. He paid the first installment but has allowed the next three to be unpaid and he declares
that he will pay no more rent. Harrison received notice on May 13th to
quit the premises in 15 days. All the goods on the premises belonged to
Harrison's wife and her son who lived with her.
Lavin for Plaintiff.
Lenahan for Defendant.
OPINION OF JUSTICE OF PEACF
POTTER, J. The defendant contends that the goods which are the
property of defendant's wife and son, are liable to distress by the landlord in satisfaction of the rent in arrears. This may be sustained according to Trickett's Landlord and Tenant page 192. It reads "Though a
wife is expected to reside with her husband, and she will naturally have
articles belonging to herself with her, such articles on the premises demised to the husband, will be liable to distress for his rent." He cites
Blanche v. Bradford, 38 Pa. 344. Hazlett v. Mangel, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 139
holds that the goods of a son are distrainable.
The Act of April 3d, 1830, P. L. 187, provides that, where there is a
lease for years, reserving rent, and there is rent in arrear and not adequate goods upon the premises to make a distress, it shall be lawful for
the lessor to give lessee notice to quit within 15 days, from such notice,
if it is given between April 1st and Sept. 1st, and within thirty days if
given between Sept. 1st and April 1st. Now then, as there is no doubt
that these goods may be distrained, the question arises whether there
is an adequate amount of goods as provided in the Act. Let us first see
what averments of fact the plaintiff's statement should set forth. According to Trickett's Landlord and Tenant, page 450, the following are
essential: The demise, the reservation of rent, the tenant's failure to
pay it, the insufficiency of the goods on the premises, not exempt from
distress, to satisfy the debt; the service of the proper notice to quit, and
the tenant's failure to pay the rent in arrears or to remove from the premises before the inception of the proceedings. In the present case all
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the essentials are proven except the insufficiency of the goods on the
premises; and the plaintiff merely assumed that the goods were not sufficient to satisfy. For this reason we may assume that the goods are sufficient and hence the plaintiff cannot dispossess the tenant. To support
this we cite Palethorp v. Schmidt, 12 Sup. 214, which holds that proof of
tenancy, rent reserved, amount in arrears, tenant's failure to pay same
after demand, without more, is not sufficient to entitle the landlord to
dispossess the tenant.
Judgment for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
One of the conditions on which a landlord may evict the tenant within the term-for non-payment of rent, is that "there are no goods on the
premises adequate to pay the said rent so in arrear, except such articles
as are exempt from levy and sale by the laws of the commonwealth."
The burden of proving the absence of such goods is upon the landlord.
Thomas v. Flamer, 1 Phila. 518.
It is made to appear that there are no goods on the premises which
belong to the tenant. The goods there belong to his wife and her son.
These goods are subject to distress, although they are not the property
of the tenant. But, is the landlord bound to distrain them, in order to
exempt the tenant from loss of the term? We are inclined to think that
the object of the statute was not to save the tenant from expulsion at the
cost of other persons where chattels might happen to be on the demised
premises. Allowing the lessor to seize the goods of strangers seems
harsh, compelling him to do so, rather than to terminate the lessee's interest in the term is still harsher.
The goods on the premises may be taken in distress. Their owners,
being the wife and her son, are, apparently not entitled to retain any of
them, under the claim of $300 worth by exemption, Swaney v. Doumont,
44 Super. 49.
But, what are these goods worth? The rent in arrear is $750. Are
these goods able if sold to produce so much, or one half, or one quarter
of so much? Conceding the liability of these goods to be taken in distress, and the inability of the landlord to oust the tenant within the term,
if their value is equal to the arrears, the burden is on the landlord to
prove the equalence of the value of the goods to the rent in arrear. He
has not proven this. If for no other reason therefore, for this reason, the
judgment of the justice was correct.
Judgment affirmed.
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FISHER v. GOBIN
Sale of Personal Property-Change of Possession-Effect Upon Vendor's
Creditors, with Knowledge of Sale
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Fisher bought a horse from Longsdorff. Gobin made the sale for
Longsdorff, collected the money from Fisher and after deducting his
commission, applied the balance to a debt owed him by Longsdorff. A
week later Gobin issued an execution on a judgment he held against
Longsdorff and he directed the sheriff to levy on this horse if still in
Longsdorff's possession. The sheriff did so and Gobin bought the horse
at the sale under the fi-fa. Fisher seeks to replevy the horse.
Long for Plaintiff.
Powell for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT
FINE, J. In determining the question in this case we are confronted,
not only with innumerable conflicting decisions in other jurisdictions, but
also with irreconcilable cases of our own courts. The question to be determined is, whether an existing creditor, who has notice that his vendor
debtor has sold a personal chattel, but merely retains the possession for
the vendee, can issue execution on such personal chattel while in possession of the vendor-debtor. Before answering this question, it is perhaps better that we deal, first, to some length upon the cases which are
material to the issue under consideration.
First,-May we ask, whether or not delivery is necessary in the case
before us. This must necessarily be answered in the affirmative It is
true that, as between the vendor and vendee, delivery is not necessary, but
as to creditors and subsequent purchaser, bona fide and for value, the rule
is otherwise.
By delivery it need not mean that a change of location is in all cases
necessary, as against creditors of the vendor. Due regard must be had
to the character of the property, the nature of the transaction, the position of the parties, and the intended use of the property. Cessua v. Nimick, 113 Pa. 70; Ayers v. McCandless, 147 Pa. 49.
From the nature of.the property in the present case, it appears that
a change'of location was necessary, in so much as it would not be cumbersome, in the least, to cause the change and for the additional fact
that vendee has done no act which constitutes or tends to ;ny change of
possession. If, in the present case, the vendor had passed the ke to the
barn in which the personalty was to the vendee, such would have been
sufficient delivery. Barr v. Reitz, 53 Pa. 256.
It was held in Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa. 219 and 27 W. N. C. 30,
that where a purchaser of a horse leaves him in the care of the same servant and in the stable belonging to the vendor, the mere fact that the
servant changes from the employ of the vendor to the vendee is not suf-
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ficient change of possession of property, as against the vendor's creditors.

Surely, then, there was not a sufficient delivery in the case b~fore us.
A case somewhat similar to the one under determination is reported in
Hoffner v. Clark, 5 Wharton 545.
In order to make a transfer of personalty available as against creditors of the vendor, it must be accompanied by possession in the vendee
at the time of the transfer or within a reasonable time thereafter. McMarian v. English, 74 Pa. 296. What is a reasonable time? That depends
upon the circumstantes of' each particular case. From the facts of the
present case we are inclined to think -a week,-for here the vendor had
possession of the horse for a week,-is an unreasonable time. If the
vendee was building a stable, or preparing to ship the horse to some point,
not having any stable to care for the animal during the interval between the
time of purchase and the time of shipment, in that event, vendor could
not be said to have had possession for an unreasonable time. But none
of the facts exists in the case at issue. McMarlan v. English, Supra.
Since it has been determined that there was no delivery of possession
in this case, it is then necessary to find out what effect this failure to
change possession will have upon the sale as to an existing creditor. In
general, a transfer of personal property, unaccompanied by any change
of possession, is fraudulent as to the vendor's creditors and the property
is subject to sale under execution against the vendor; to constitute a
valid sale, there must be actual and continuing possession. Streeper v.
Eckert, 2 Whart 302; Early v. Withers, 1 Pearson 248.
As a general rule, it is necessary, in order to perfect title of the vendee of personal property as against persons other than vendor, that there
should be a delivery of possession to him. Such detention of possession
or apparent title by the vendor amounts to fraud per se and as such renders the sale absolutely void. No explanation being admissible, it raises
a conclusive presumption. 14 A. & E., 356 and 357.
The Pa. doctrine is that the retention of possession by the vendor
is fraud in law wherever the subject of transfer is capable of delivery
and no fair reason can be assigned for vendor not giving it up and the
vendee not taking possession. Clow v. Wood, 5 S. & R. 275; Babb v.
Clemson, 10 S. & R.; Haynes v. Hunsicker, 26 Pa. 58; Born v. Share, 29
Pa. 288; Garman v. Cooper, 72 Pa. 37 and numerous others
It has been held that the rule, as given above, does not apply in favor
of creditors and purchasers having actual notice of the sale. But the
preponderance 'of authority is against allowing such an exception to the
rule, at least where the creditor's claims have accrued before the sale.
Warwick Iron Co. v. Bank of Honeybrook, 10 Sadler 14. The present
case falls within the very scope of the above authority, for here Gobin
was an existing creditor and also had notice of the sale.

It was held in McMarlan v. English, 74 Pa. 296, that in order to set
aside a sale as fraudulent against subsequent creditors, it is necessary
that there be fraudulent intent as to them. But nothing has been said
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about existing creditors and hence in any event, where there is a sale
and the vendor retains posse.ssion, the conveyance is presumed to be
fraudulent, whether or not the parties had such fraudulent intentions.
No doubt it might be well to state here the charge of the learned
court, about the retention of possession in a sale of personalty, in Chase
v. Garrett, 1 Sadler 16. It is "change of possession which law requires
is such as the nature and character of property, situation and relation of
parties, renders reasonable, such as is reasonable under the circumstances, taking into consideration the nature and character of the property. For example, upon sale of horses it is very easy to pass it from
hand to hand, and, in such cases, when the vendor retains possession, it
is fraudulent as against creditors and subsequent purchasers."
Another rule in addition to the one previously cited is that such retention of possession is prima facie evidence of the fraud. The other
rule states that such retention of possession is conclusive evidence of
fraud. In either event, the result in this case would be the same, as there
is nothing to rebut any presumption of fraud.
Therefore, even if Gobin may have by fraud obtained possession of
the horse, nevertheless Longsdorff and Fisher were both implicated in
a fraudulent conveyance and hence the law will leave the parties in the
same status where it finds them.
Judgment for Defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
It has been stated by high authority that "the general rule in
Pennsylvania has been settled for almost a century that the sale of personalty unless followed by a change of possession is fraudulent as a matter of law as against the vendor's existing creditors." Williston on
Sales sec. 391. The same view of the Pennsylvania doctrine has been
taken by other authorities and is verified by the cases. Burdick on
Sales 200, Tiffany on Sales 201, Tiedman on Sales sec. 84a.
The narrower question presented by this case is whether such a sale
is fraudulent as a matter of law as to existing creditors who have been
notified of the sale, and the authorities cited do not afford a specific answer to this question.
It seems that the rule prevailing in most jurisdictions is that the
fact that the creditor had notice of the sale is immaterial. "Notice of a
transfer of personal property without delivery will not prevent an existing creditbr from seizing it upon attachment or execution," 20 Cyc. 551.
"It has been held that the rule does not apply in favor of creditors having actual notice of the sale. But a preponderance of authority is against
allowing such an exception to the rule, at least where the creditor's claim
had accrued before the sale." 14 A. & E. Encyc. 361.
The question seems never to have been discussed as an original one
in Pennsylvania. Stark v. Ward, 3 Pa. 328 is cited in 4 Vale Deg. c. 10721
and Cyc. as holding that retention of possession renders a sale fraudulent
as to existing creditors without regard to the question of notice. In
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this case the goods were awarded to the creditor who had been notified
of the sale and the court said. "Notice of a fraudulent transfer will not
prevent a bonafide creditor from taking the goods in execution," but
there was evidence that the sale was actually intended to defraud creditors and this fact was made the basis of the decision.
Warwick Iron Co. v. Bank, 10 Sad. 14, is cited in 14 A. & E. 361,
20 Cyc. 551, Williston on Sales sec. 391, and the opinion of the learned court
below, as holding that a sale without delivery of possession is voidable
by an existing creditor with notice. An examination of this case discloses the fact that it is incorrectly cited by these authorities. The property, of the' sale of which the creditor had notice, was awarded to the
vendee and not to the creditor and one of the reasons given for so holding was the fact that the creditor had been notified of the sale. The case
is an authority against, rather than for, the proposition for which it has
been cited. The remarks of the court as to notice were, however, dicta.
An eminent authority, after an elaborate review of the Pennsylvania
cases says, "In fact it would seem that no notice of any sort to an individual creditor will render a sale unaccompanied by change of possession
valid as to him," Willaston on Sales sec. 391, and that there are Pennsylvania cases in which this doctrine has been tacitly applied. Willaston on Sales sec. 391.
In this state of the authorities we cannot say that, as a matter of
authority, the decision of the learned court below was so unwarranted as
to justify a reversal, but in affirming we wish to suggest that, as a matter of principle, we emphatically disagree with the conclusion to which
the learned court below has come. The reason advanced for holding a
sale without delivery of possession fraudulent as to existing creditors, is
that, under such appearances of ownership, every man is justified in regarding the vendor as still the owner, and, having become his creditor,
in extending him indulgence because of such ownership. Streeper v.Echart, 2 Wharton 207. Obviously this reason is not applicable, when as in
the present case, the creditor knew of the sale and did not know that the
vendor had remained in possession.
The delivery of possession required by the Pennsylvania rule is such
as will reasonably indicate the change of ownership. 8 P. & L. Deg.
12683. If the purpose of the delivery is simply to indicate a change Uf
ownership, it would seem that where the change of ownership is known
to the creditor no delivery is necessary.
In a leading case the reason for the Pennsylvania rule is said to be
when a loss must be borne by one of two innocent parties it should be
borne by him whose act or omission has made the loss possible. Stephens
v. Gifford, 137 Pa. 229. It requires an active imagination to regard the
creditor in this case as an innocent party, and as there is no evidence
that his debtor did not have other property upon which a levy could be
made, it might well be said that his act or omission has made the loss
possible.
Affirmed.
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JOHN HOLLIDAY v. AUGUSTUS TENSON

Negotiable Instrument-Alteration-Presumption
of Proof

of Innocence-Burden

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Suit on a note for $500, which was signed as maker by Tenson. His
defence is that another amount had been originally written, viz, $600,
and had been altered to $500. When the note was offered, the -court,
looking at it, decided that it had been altered, and could not be admitted
in evidence unless an explanation of the alteration was made. Plaintiff contended that there was a presumption that the alteration had been
made before the delivery of the note by Tenson, and that it should be admitted in evidence.
Martin for Plaintiff.
Fry for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
CAPPIELLO, J. As a general rule the law presumes in favor of
innocence, that an alteration in an instrument is a legitimate part of it,
till the contrary appears, but this presumption does not extend to alterations of negotiable instruments.
The policy of the law is against all tampering with written instruments and especially commercial papers. He who takes a blemished
bill or note, takes it with all its imperfections on its head. The very
fact that he received it is presumptive evidence that it was unaltered at
the time. (Especially here in this case, where it seems that the alteration was made in favor of the defendant, changing the amount from
$600 to $500; surely the plaintiff would guard himself from an act which
tended to hinder his interest). The maker of a note cannot be expected
to account for what happened to it after it left his hands, for a payee or
endorsee who takes it condemned and discredited on the face of it, ought
to be prepared to show what it was when he received it. Heffner v. Wenrick, 32 Pa. 423; Simpson v. Stackhouse, 9 Pa. 186; Nagle's Estate, 134
Pa. 31.
It might be said on the part of the plaintiff, that the fact that the alteration was in favor of the defendant, raises the presumption that the
alteration was made prior to its execution. But as Judge Woodward
said in Heffner v. Wenrick, 32 Pa. 423; it follows from many Pennsylvania cases, as well as both American and English cases, that the maker
of a negotiable paper is always to be presumed in the absence of evidence to have issued it free and clear from all blemishes, erasures and
alterations, whether of the date or body of .the instrument and the burden
of showing that it was defective when issued, is upon the holder, even
though the alteration be beneficial to the maker. Until the plaintiff gives
evidence of the alteration before delivery, the prima facia presumption is
that the note came from the hands of the maker in a perfect state,
whether benefitted or prejudiced by the alteration.
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In 35 L. R. A. 470, a number of Pennsylvania cases and also cases
of other States in the Union can be found, where it is held :-The holder must explain the alterations of the paper when he takes it. Heffner v. Wenrick, 32 Pa. 423; Simpson v. Stackhouse, 9 Pa. 186; Paine v.
Edsell, 19 Pa. 178; Hill v. Cooley, 46 Pa. 259; Kennedy v. Lancaster
City Bank, 18 Pa. 347; Hartley v. Corbay, 150 Pa. 23.
We think that the note should not have been admitted except in connection with evidence tending to explain the alteration, and then it should
have been referred to the jury to say whether the alteration, if any, was
made before or after the defendant parted with the note.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
In a large number of jurisdictions the general doctrine is recognized
that alterations apparent on the face of an instrument raise a presumption
that they were made after the execution of the instrument and that therefore, explanatory evidence must be given by the party offering the instrument before it will be allowed to go to the jury. 39 L. R. A. N. S. 100.
In many other jurisdictions a rule directly opposed to the one stated,
is asserted, and it is held that in absence of other suspicious circumstances, an alteration apparent upon the face of the instrument will be presumed to have been made before the execution of the instrument, and
that therefore the instrument should be admitted in evidence without
any explanatory evidence on the part of the party offering it. 39 L. R.
A. N. S. 103.
A third rule, which is at present being adopted in many jurisdictions,
is that an alteration, apparent upon the face of an instrument, raises no
presumption as to the time when it was made. 39 L. R. A. N. S. 112.
If the first rule is the correct one, the ruling of the trial court was
right; if either the second or the third rule is the correct one, the ruling of the trial court was erroneous.
The Pennsylvania courts in many cases have asserted and applied
the first rule. "When it clearly appears on the face of a writing that it
has been altered in a material part, it is incumbent on the party producing it to account for the alteration, and until this is done, it is not admissible in evidence. The rule is more stringent when applied to negotiable paper, than to other instruments, and in relation to it, there is no
presumption of innocence and the burden of explaining any apparent material alteration is cast on the holder thereof." Cornog v. Wilson, 231
Pa. 281. See also Penna. cases collected in 39 L. R. A. N. S., 110, and
2 Cyc. 241.
It has been suggested that the rule as to the presumption raised by
an apparent alteration might be affected by the question' whether the
alteration is beneficial to the holder or otherwise, Jordon v. Stewart, 23
Pa. 244, but this suggestion tho of great merit, has not been acted upon
in subsequent cases as to negotiable paper. Heffner v. Wenrick, 32 Pa.
423; Frey v. Wessner, 1 Woodward, 145; Struthers v. Kendall, 41 Pa.
214; 39 L. R. A. N. S., 101.
judgment affirmed.
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BOOK REVIEW
Letters to a Young Lawyer, by Arthur M. Harris, of the Seattle Bar.
West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn., 1912.

The

This little book of nearly two hundred pages contains eighteen letters
which purport to be written by a lawyer to his son, who is about to graduate from a law school. The young man is variously admonished, e. g., not
to think because he was trained at a law school, that he is "infinitely superior to the office-bred lawyer." He is reminded that all law students
are not studious. Observations on the prodigious number of lawyers
who are annually turned out, seem rather wanting in originality. The
author seems to recommend practice in a small town, probably because
that is the only practice of which he has knowledge. He sagely remarks
that "twenty years with a corporation spoils a man and his chances of
ever practicing" and advises the young man not to work at all for a corporation, if he cannot go to work for it "as a fifteen thousand dollar
man." There may be rare wisdom in these lectures, but the evident
straining after jocularity and whimsicalness does not help ns to discover
it.

